Murphy suggests in the June issue of the journal (1) that the anti-abortionist, by virtue of that moral position, is logically obliged to try and prevent spontaneous abortions, even those presently undetected, and find treatment for them. The issue of spontaneous abortion is important, but his discussion of the possible answers to his view omits surely the most obvious one; the 'acts and omissions doctrine'. Many ethicists (particularly among those in the Catholic position who oppose abortion) would draw a distinction between killing, which is how they perceive induced abortion, and letting die which is what occurs in spontaneous abortion. Given that a distinction between these two categories is morally relevant, two levels of obligation can logically be assumed. There seems no logical reason why one should not decide to refrain from active abortion, with all its practical moral sequelae in terms of care of unwanted infants etc; but not actively strive to prevent spontaneous abortion. There are limited resources for saving life (by medical research and/or clinical activity) and one may choose, on consequentialist or other grounds not related to the personhood of the fetus, to direct those energies elsewhere. True, the logic of the acts/omissions doctrine can be challenged, as Rachels (2) and Glover (3) 
